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In an earlier paper' I showed that the thesis of a
'culture of poverty' (COP) lends itself to perni-
cious political uses, by (a) seeming to attribute
responsibility for poverty to poor people them-
selves, because of their 'culture', (b) focusing on
the local and family level, ignoring the unseen
forces of the wider society which determine the
meagre distribution of resources to the poor, and
(e) seeming to give priority to attempts to
change culture, through counselling services (in
rich countries) and through education. I took it
for granted, however, that the question of how
the culture of poor people influences their be-
haviour, and their poverty, is an empirical one,
and that it is therefore worth looking at the
available literature to see what kinds of answers
it has to suggest.
Since then I have become increasingly alarmed
by the ease with which otherwise subtle, dis-
criminating persons reject the very idea of a
culture of povertynot only in saloon bars and
over dinner tables, but in serious academic dis-
cussion. The Roaches' book of readings on
poverty provides an example. The book confines
COP to a footnote in the introduction, on the
grounds that, 'The thesis of a culture of poverty
is such a hazy notion that we have doubts about
its descriptive value, not to mention its explana-
tory sgnificance'.2 Significantly enough the book
contains several case studies of the life of specific
groups of poor people, and other essays which
deal in a generalizing way with problems of
measurement, causes and remedies; but not a
single attempt to deal in a generalizing way with
the lifeways and culture of poor peopleto see
whether there are not some similarities in the
way that urban slum dwellers of Palermo,
Calcutta, Sao Paulo, perceive their situation, in
the values they (consciously and unconsciously)
hold, and in the effects of these common percep-
tions and values on response to changes in their
situation. The Roaches dismiss COP on grounds
of haziness; a more constructive reaction would
be to make it less hazy. The usual reason for re-
jecting it, however, is because of its pernicious
political role, its use by politicians and planners
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1 "A culture of poverty?" IDS Bulletin, 5 (2/3), 4-30, 1973.
IDS Bulletin, (1), 1975 titled "Cultural Dependence," con-
tains a number of articles which pay some attention to the
role of cultural factors in development.
2 J. Roach and J. Roach, eds., Poverty: Selected Readings,
Harmondsworth, Penguin Press, 1972, p.12, n.4.
to explain the failure of their programmes to re-
duce poverty, to explain their concentration on
low-cost education and counselling rather than
on more expensive and more directly redistribu-
tive measures, or to justify the failure to have
any redistributive programmes at all. Hence it
is often said that one should pay attention to
COP only insofar as it is something which politi-
cians and planners commonly believe; in this
sense only does COP matter.
Truth and political implication
This conclusion, it seems to me, rests on a serious
confusion between empirical truth-content, on the
one hand, and ideological origins and political
uses on the other (a confusion not unrelated to
the wholesale retreat of traditional empiricism in
British and American universities).
Here I can do little more than restate the dis-
tinction as I see it. While an understanding of the
ideological bases and political roles of 'scientific'
hypotheses can help explain and predict both
their empirical weaknesses and the conditions in
which they become popular among certain groups
or classes, this understanding does not speak
directly to the truth of those hypotheses. In the
case of the COP thesis, there are at least three
major hypotheses, all conceivably capable of
being questioned by empirical data. But the
sweeping rejection of COP ideas is in my experi-
ence generally done prior to a careful considera-
tion of the evidence. It is true that most of the
evidence used to support a COP interpretation-
for example, correlations between income, on the
one hand, and on the other, questionnaire res-
ponses which suggest the degree to which the
respondent sees the world as an unpredictable
placeis not very reliable. But the fact that the
evidence is not very good should encourage
attempts to improve it, not to ignore it.
Part of the trouble with COP, for many social
scientists, is its identification of 'the poor' as a
relevant analytical category. To focus on poverty
and the poor, they argue, is to think about the
problem of inequality in terms of statistical in-
come distributions: the poor are those below a
certain (more or less arbitrary) line, the bottom
decile or quintile or 40 per cent. This is accept-
able for purely descriptive purposes. But an
explanation for poverty, they argue, must be set
in the context of the systematic nature of class
inequality. For explanatory purposes the funda-
mental characteristic is not poverty but sub-
ordination: it is because of their subordination
that members of the subordinate class are (or
remain) poor; subordination generates poverty,
not vice versa. Those who talk of poverty rather
than subordination, of poor people rather than
proletariat, lumpen-proletariat (or other class
categories) are guilty of mystifying this point, and
of supposing (like the Poverty Warriors of the
American War On Poverty, if anyone still re-
members) that something can be done about
poverty without first altering the structure of
domination and subordination which produces it.
Surely the connection between poverty and sub-
ordination is two-way: subordination generates
poverty, yes; and poverty generates (or at least
helps to ptpetuate) subordination. Increases in
the income level of members of the subordinate
class may e a necessary condition for collective
action to change the structure of domination and
subordination. But the immediate point to make
here is that whether it is called a culture of
poverty or a culture of subordination, one is
interested in discovering the range of responses
to the facts of poverty, inequality and low status,
how people in that situation manage to cope, the
designs for living, the codes of understanding, the
aspirations, the values they adopt.
The current orthodoxy
These days, however, the majority of social
scientists would not in fact be interested in such
matters, because they believe implicitly or ex-
plicitly that things like perceptions, aspirations,
values (meaning-systems, or culture for short) are
of little significance for understanding behaviour.
The current orthodoxy, ascribed to by social
scientists right across the academic and political
spectrum, from Marxian and neo-classical
economists, Marxian political scientists and
sociologists, to social anthropologists in the tradi-
tion of Radcliffe-Brown, states that the critical
factors in social causation are the distribution of
resources and power, and the material and
physical constraints. To these critical factors the
orthodoxy (called by J. D. Y. Peel the 'situational'
or 'structural' approach)3 applies a rough and
ready, common-sense view of perceptions and
values: men everywhere seek much the same
things (power, wealth) and perceive their environ-
ment much as it objectively is. The implication
is that there are few if any circumstances when
cultural factors have to be admitted as significant
3 See the excellent paper by J. D. Y. Peel for a fuller treat-
ment of some of th points made here: "Cultural factors in
the contemporary theory of development", Archives Euro-
péennes de Sociologie, XIV, 1973, 283-303.
independent variables in social explanation. Cul-
tural factors may of course be admitted as
causes in an ad hoc kind of way. But this is done
in the absence of any general and systematicjustification for how and when such ad hoc in-
corporations are to be made. Concepts such as
'utility' and 'leisure preference' in neo-classical
economics, 'false consciousness' and even 'ex-
ploitation' in Marxian analysis are used as ques-
tion-stopping devices, to insulate the paradigm,
to justify ending the enquiry before entering the
realm of culture.
The 'situational' orthodoxy, in all its various ex-
pressions, is thus the direct descendant of the
18th century Enlightenment view of Man. Man
in his essence was seen to be as regular, as in-
variant with respect to time and place, as
wondrously simple as natural science showed the
physical universe to be.
Today, situationalists adopt this view not out of
a concern to define what the essence is, but as a
way of allowing concentration on the real, under-
lying facts of resources and power. But just as
the Enlightenment thinkers took the vast variety
of human belief, customs and institutions as with-
out significance for defining his nature, so modern
situationalists assume that culture is gloss, garb,
appearance, a mere epiphenomenon of material
and physical constraints.
Culture does matter
Recent evidence from human biology and
hominid paleontology suppotts a quite different
intrepretation. In this view, the outstanding
characteristic of homo sapiens, in comparison
with other animals, is not so much what he is
capable of learning as what he must learn in order
to function at all. In place of regular and detailed
genetic control mechanisms on behaviour, man
has generalized genetic response capabilities, plus
culturea learned set of rules and designs (what
computer engineers call programmes). The innate
response capabilities, plus cultural programmes,
plus situational constraints, govern behaviour.
Perhaps the best way to convince British and
American situationalists that culture does matter
is to ask them why they do not eat dog or cat
and indeed feel revulsion at the very thought,
though dog and cat are not less situationally
feasible than beef and are probably equally good
in nutritional value. Or why do we feed horse
to dog, but not to ourselves? Why does pig,
cut-for-cut, cost less than beef? Why are innards
less expensive and less prestigious than muscle
cuts? To understand these things we must ask
about the symbolic relations between men and
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animals.4 The series: cattle, pig, horse, dog is
ordered according to our view of edibleness-
cattle most edible, dog least. The series is also
ordered according to the type of participation in
the company of man. Dogs are household pets
and are named. Horses, too, are petted and
named; but have a work role which dogs do not
have. The pig operates on the margins of society,
as scavenger of human leftovers; and is not
named or given a work role. Cattle are furthest
removed. Hence the more the animal participates
in the company of manthe closer to ourselves
it becomesthe less we want to eat it. (Least of
all we want to eat ourselves!) The same sort of
reasoning may lie behind our preferences for
muscle-cuts over innards: innards are 'closer in',
to the animal self, muscle-cuts further out; so
innards are stigmatised as poor man's food (the
'soulfood' of American blacks); and the price of
tongue is rather less than the price of steak,
although there is a good deal more steak about
than tongue. This particular interpretation of
edibility is clearly open to debate. All I want to
insist on is that there is more to questions of
edibility than nourishment or arbitrary fancy;
that there is more to the question of why Jews
do not eat pork than hygiene as if Moses was
the first public health inspector!). More generally,
it is the symbolic (cultural) organization of objects
in relation to man which organizes demand and
provides the intention for production. Production
and consumption are cultural intentions. The
situational perspective gives little illumination
here.
Take another, quite unrelated example, which is
somewhat closer to the burning issues of the day.
Situational variables seem to be of very little
help in explaining the fact that Chinese and
Japanese immigrants in the United States have
within two generations moved into white middle
class occupations, while other immigrant groups,
such as Puerto Ricans and Irish, have tended to
remain in low income occupations and poor
quality housing.
A study of Japanese immigrants, from a mainly
rural, peasant background, who came (or whose
parents came) to the United States with only
temporary settlement in mind, showed that they
had values which in some respects were remark-
ably similar to those of the white lower middle
class, and both significantly different in these
respects to those of the white working class.5
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4 This example comes
and Edmund Leach,
developed by Levi S5 W. Caudil and G.
personality: the case
Anthropologist, 1956,
from the work of Marshall Sahlins
and follows the hn of analysis first
traust.
de Vos, "Achievement, culture and
of the Japanese Americans", American
58, 1102-1126.
The similarities were partïcularly marked in the
emphasis on personal achievement of long-range
goals, on goal definition in terms of higher educa-
tion, professional occupations, the building of a
spotless reputation in the community, diligence,
and respect for authority and parental wishes.
These qualities earned the praise of white
teachers and employers. Hence the Japanese have
succeeded more than other immigrant groups who
have been longer in the United States and some
of whom appear to be less handicapped by racial
and cultural differencesfor reasons to do with
certain aspects of their culture in relation to the
culture of lower middle and middle class America(and also, of course, to the position of these
classes in the American class structure, and the
responsiveness of American institutions to the
standards of that culture).
Some implications
So what? What consequences for policies and
programmes follow from the statement that
different groups have different cultures, which
make for differential 'success' in a given institu-
tional setting? One reason for the rush to dismiss
COP ideas6 is the genuine desire not to 'write
people off', not to say: "the Puerto Ricans don't
make it in the system because of their culture".
The concern is justified, but I do not agree that
to recognize that differences in culture as well as
in situation account for differential response to
changes and programmes, leads in any logical way
to 'writing people off'. It may be used to do so,
but to counter this use requires a different sort
of argument, not an attempt to deny that culture
matters.
Situationalists must face the fact that in ignoring
cultural factors they do make cultural assump-
tions, assumptions which evidence could be
brought to bear on. For some questions and for
some purposes, cultural factors may be justifiably
ignored. But especially when examining situa-
tions of change, situationalists concerned with
poverty and subordination need to be aware of
their propensity to assume that the culture of
poor/subordinate groups or categories does not
hinder response to changes in the objective situa-
tion. It is foolhardy to claim, as some extreme
situationalists have done, that people can dis-
card their ways of adapting to relative adapta-
tion as fast as old clothes, that no 'cultural lag'
is to be expected. However there is remarkably
little evidence on rates of adaptation to new
situations, only conjecture and assertion. Most of
the social studies of poor urban peoples have been
6 And also the idea that there may be genetic influences cn
some of the things which sociologists insist must alwaysbe due to culture and social structure, for a similar reason.
instable, not changing, situations. Hence we know
surprisingly little about matters like how rapidly
aspirations change. There is some evidence that
some poor people in America have distinctly
lower aspirations than those who are better off,
presumably as a means of coping with their
deprivation. But how rapidly will their aspirations
rise if the possibilities for realising them are en-
hanced? To what extent can aspirations learnt
before adulthood be increased? Do low aspira-
tions (in terms of higher education, job status,
housing) in some way block the take-up of new
opportunities? We do not really know, and the
situational approach does not lead us to want to
know.
However, proponents of a cultural approach are
not likely to be of much help for these questions
either. Culturalists tend to assume the causal
primacy of cultural factors as situationalists
assume the situational. Levi Strauss's cognitive
systems, eerily disembodied from social processes,
are only extreme instances of a common failing.
But at least Levi Strauss is analytical. With few
exceptions, the writers who have used the idea
of a culture of poverty have used it as no more
than a descriptive device. While their data is
useful, they have developed few theoretical con-
structs. Situationalists, then, cannot simply say
that culture is for someone else to worry about;
the onus for arriving at a general and systematic
justification for bringing cultural factors into their
analyses is theirs.
Perhaps the most promising framework for
tackling the issues raised by the idea of a culture
of poverty is that sketched by Frank Parkin in a
discussion of class inequality and meaning-
systems.7 (Parkin, incidentally, is a Marxist
sociologistif a clear and simple writing style
does not count as a disqualification.) He begins by
7 F. Parkin, Class Inc quality cnd Political Order, St. Albans,
Paladin, 1972, Ch. 3.
recognizing that individuals do not construct their
social worlds in terms of a wholly personal vision,
but with organizing concepts which are part of
a public meaning-system. What then are the major
public meaning-systems 'available' in a society?
He distinguishes three major meaning-systems
available in most Western societies, each of which
derives from a different social source and each
of which promotes a different moral interpreta-
tion of class inequality: 1. the dominant value
system, which promotes the endorsement of exist-
ing inequality, and which promotes among the
subordinate class a definition of the reward struc-
ture in either deferential or aspirational terms; 2.
the subordinate value system, which promotes
accommodative responses to inequality and low
status, and which is generated in the milieu of
local working-class communities; and 3. the
radical value system, which promotes an opposi-
tional interpretation of inequality, and which is
generated by a mass political party based on the
working class. Variations in the culture of poor!
subordinate groups or individuals depend to some
extent on their access to these meaning-systems.
Occupation, or relationship to the means of
production, is one obvious influence on access.
Parkin goes some way towards describing the
structure of these meaning-systems, and identify-
ing the factors which incline individuals to draw
their ideas from one or other of them. One can
see immediately how ideas of the culturalists
about the structure of cultural systems might con-
tribute to the development of the argument, with-
in a framework which embraces the material and
physical constraints on action which culturalists
are prone to ignore. It is a big step beyond the
crude 'culture of poverty' idea. But Parkin says
nothing about the question which is at the fore-
front of the culture of poverty literature: to what
extent does attachment to one meaning-system,
one programme, influence (facilitate, hinder)
change to another when circumstances change.
He remains too much a situationalist.
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